



Abstract: According to many of its advocates, one of the main attractions of
Kantian moral philosophy is its metaethical innocence. The most interesting ar-
gument for such innocence appeals to Kantians’ rationalism. Roughly, if moral
action is simply rational action, then we do not need to appeal to anything be-
yond rationality to certify moral judgment. I assess this argument by reflecting
on (dis)analogies betweenmoral and logical forms of rationalism. I conclude that
the Kantian claim to metaethical innocence is overstated. Kantians cannot avoid
substantial metaethical commitments. Or if they can, it is not their rationalism
that explains why this is so.
There is a distinct anti‐metaphysical strain in contemporary neo‐Kantian moral philosophy.
One prominent expression of this strain is the self‐conscious rejection of Kant’s transcendental
idealism – in particular, Kant’s conception of themoral agent as transcendentally free. Although
Kant himself stakes the very possibility of morality on such freedom, his followers have mostly
abandoned its defense on grounds of metaphysical extravagance. Thus, a viable Kantianism, as
John Rawls said, ‘must be detached from its background in transcendental idealism’ and made
to satisfy ‘the canons of a reasonable empiricism’ (Rawls, 1977, p. 165).
But there is another way in which contemporary Kantians have tried to minimize metaphys-
ics; one tied less to the repudiation of Kant’s own account and more to a particular interpreta-
tion of its core commitments. Although this line of thought, like the first, has roots in Rawls,
it has been pressed with special vigor by his students. Consider, for example, Christine
Korsgaard’s claim that
[p]art of the appeal of [the Kantian approach to moral philosophy] is that it avoids certain
sources of skepticism that some other approachesmeet with inevitability. If ethically good action
is simply rational action, we do not need to postulate special ethical properties in the world or
faculties in the mind, in order to provide ethics with a foundation (Korsgaard, 1996a, p. 311).
In this way, Kantianism is supposed to provide an attractive alternative to moral realism,
which many think founders precisely on such postulation. By grounding ethics in reason
rather than the world, the Kantian claims to do more with less: to get maximum normative
bang for minimum metaethical buck.
Although the (in)dispensability of transcendental idealism for Kantian ethics is of great im-
portance, I will not address the issue here. Rather, I want to focus on the second
anti‐metaphysical strain, which, in part because of Rawls’ and Korsgaard’s influence, has
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become something close to orthodoxy in contemporary discussions of Kantianism.1 Indeed, un-
der the name ‘constructivism’ it has become, for many people, nearly definitive of Kantianism.2
That said, I think the case for constructivism is not strong, either as an interpretation of Kant or,
more importantly, as an articulation of the philosophically defensible core of Kantianism. My
aim in this paper is to rough out one reason why.
In particular, I want to challenge the thought, suggested by the Korsgaard quote above, that
Kantianism ismetaethically innocent –more specifically, thatKantians’ rationalism allows them
to avoid substantial metaphysical commitment. I will do this in three stages. First, I distinguish
two degrees of metaphysical commitment Kantians might avoid in the form of two kinds of con-
structivism they might embrace: one of which avoids moral metaphysics altogether (non‐
cognitivism), the other of which simply domesticates moral metaphysics by making it
mind‐dependent (idealism).3 Second, focusing on the non‐metaphysical, non‐cognitivist form
of constructivism, I cast doubt on its relation to rationalism. I do this by reflecting on Bernard
Williams’ intriguing thought thatKantiansmodel morality on logic. As I explain, there is a sense
in which this is true, but not a sense that supports non‐cognitivism. Third, I use the logical anal-
ogy to argue that the Kantian account of morality is in fact most naturally understood as
cognitivist. If this is right, then Kantians cannot avoid substantial metaphysical commitment,
if only of an idealist kind. Or if they can, it is not their rationalism that explains why this is so.
I.
As I noted above, Kantian constructivism is typically presented as an alternative to moral
realism. This seems right. But there are different ways to resist realism, and it is not always
clear which way the constructivist wants to take. To see this, consider the following passage
from another Kantian constructivist, Andrews Reath, in which he contrasts constructivism
with realism:
[According to realists,] the objectivity of moral claims comes from [a] mind‐independent order of
moral facts: moral judgments about right and wrong are true when they accurately reflect these
facts. Constructivists, by contrast, do not appeal to any such mind‐independent order of moral
facts to ground moral objectivity. A moral judgment is correct not because it accurately reflects
the independent moral facts, but because it is arrived at through correct reasoning – i.e., through
deliberation that satisfies the constraints that come from practical reason and the aim of reason-
able agreement (Reath, 2010, p. 463).
The realist position here is clear enough: There are mind‐independent moral facts and moral
correctness – or, as I shall prefer to say, moral truth – is to be understood in terms of the accurate
representation of those facts.4 The constructivist denies this. But what is it exactly that the con-
structivist denies? There seem to be two possibilities, depending on which of the above conjuncts
she objects to.
First, the constructivist could object to the realist’s metaphysics. The problem here would
be that the realist misunderstands the nature of moral facts. The realist thinks they are mind‐
independent when they are actually mind‐dependent. This would, in effect, make constructiv-
ism a form of idealism. There really are moral facts, and moral judgments really are true
when they represent those facts accurately. It is just that those facts depend on us, in the
sense that they are constituted by the outcome of our ideal reasoning.5
Second, the constructivist could object to the realist’s semantics. The problem here would not
be that the realist has misunderstood the nature of moral facts. The problem would be that she
has misunderstood the nature of moral truth. Moral judgments are not true in virtue of their ac-
curately representing moral facts, whatever their nature may be. They are true in virtue of
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something else, namely, in virtue of satisfying the principles of correct reasoning, which are prin-
ciples that, presumably, do not themselves depend for their correctness on their relation to the
facts. This would, in effect, make constructivism a form of non‐cognitivism – more specifically,
a form of semantic non‐factualism.6Moral judgments can be true, but it is not the facts thatmake
them so.
While Kantian constructivists do not typically identify as idealists, there seems no special dif-
ficulty classifying them as such, at least when their view is construed metaphysically. The same
cannot be said of their non‐cognitivism. Indeed, Reath explicitly warns against understanding
constructivism as a form of non‐cognitivism on the grounds that constructivists, unlike non‐
cognitivists, allow moral judgments to be true and to express beliefs (Reath, 2010, p. 463). But
this is a mistake, or at least misleading. First, as I noted a moment ago, the form of
non‐cognitivism at issue here is semantic rather than psychological; it concerns the kind of truth
moral judgments realize, not the kind of state moral judgments express.7 Second, so understood,
the key dispute between cognitivists and non‐cognitivists does not concern whether moral judg-
ments can be true simpliciter. Rather, it concerns whether moral judgments can be true in virtue
of accurately representing moral facts. According to cognitivists, they can be. According to non‐
cognitivists, they cannot, although they may still be true in some other way.8 What is distinctive
of non‐cognitivist Kantian constructivism, then, is its particular account of what this other way
is: again, moral judgments are true in virtue of satisfying rational principles.
These two interpretations of Kantian constructivism, the idealist and the non‐cognitivist, are
not often distinguished, even (and especially) by constructivists themselves. But they are clearly
and importantly different. In particular, idealist constructivism, like the realism it opposes, is a
form of cognitivism; it appeals to moral facts as truth‐makers of moral judgment and so is
obliged to provide some account of these facts, an obligation it discharges, again, by reference
to the outcome of our ideal reasoning. Non‐cognitivist constructivism, by contrast, precisely be-
cause it is non‐cognitivist, dispenses with moral facts. They are idle. We can account for moral
truth perfectly well without them. To this extent, non‐cognitivist constructivism seemsmore rad-
ically minimalist, more metaethically innocent, than idealist constructivism, purporting to do
without metaphysics altogether – or, at least, with no more metaphysics than is necessary to ac-
count for the operations of reason itself.9
Because, again, Kantian constructivists do not often distinguish these interpretations, it is dif-
ficult to say with confidence which constructivism is being advanced when, and I will make no
attempt to settle the issue here.10 That said, I think we can sensibly consider which lines of Kant-
ian thought might reasonably be taken to corroborate which constructivist conclusions and
whether they in fact do so. This is what I propose to do here, limning the outer bounds of Kant-
ianmetaethics by examining the non‐metaphysical, non‐cognitivist form ofKantian constructiv-
ism. What I want to know is this: Do Kantian premises plausibly support non‐cognitivist
conclusions?
II.
Now, there is an obvious reason one might answer in the affirmative. Kantianism supports
non‐cognitivism because, according to Kantians, moral judgments are practical, and what is
practical cannot be at the same time cognitive. This is a Humean thought, although not one
thought by Humeans alone. Indeed, Korsgaard herself appears to endorse it in a number of
places, and no less an authority than Allan Gibbard counts her a non‐cognitivist for precisely
this reason.11
But while this practicality argument for non‐cognitivism is perhaps the most obvious
available to the Kantian, it is not the only or the most interesting one. For there is another,
more distinctively Kantian argument, suggested by the Korsgaard quote cited in my intro-
duction: ‘if ethically good action is simply rational action, we do not need to postulate
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special ethical properties in the world or faculties in the mind, in order to provide ethics
with a foundation’ (Korsgaard, 1996a, p. 311). What Korsgaard seems to be claiming here
is that metaethical innocence follows from Kantian rationalism itself. It is because Kantians
assimilate the moral to the rational that they are able to minimize their metaphysical
commitments.12
BecauseKorsgaard does not distinguish idealist and non‐cognitivist forms ofKantianism, it is
not clear howminimal she takes these commitments to be– in particular, whether the ‘special eth-
ical properties in the world’ that the Kantian can (allegedly) do without are simply
mind‐independent properties, inwhich case, theKantian could still be an idealist; orwhether they
are ethical properties simpliciter, in which case, the Kantian would be a non‐cognitivist.13 But
whatever Korsgaard has in mind here, I think it is worth entertaining the more radical,
non‐cognitivist interpretation of her claim. So understood, we can read her as at least adumbrat-
ing a rationality argument for non‐cognitivism. Kantianism supports non‐cognitivism because,
according to Kantians, the assimilation of the moral to the rational allows for an explanation
of moral truth in terms of principles rather than facts.
This is not, I think, an unusual way of understanding Kantian metaethical ambitions. Con-
sider, for example, BernardWilliams’ discussion of Kantianism in his paper ‘Ethics and the Fab-
ric of the World’ (Williams, 1995). Although ultimately a critic of Kantianism, Williams agrees
withKorsgaard that traditional forms ofmoral skepticism, represented in his discussion by John
Mackie, do not have purchase against the Kantian. In particular, they presuppose a picture of
moral objectivity and truth that Kantians reject.
According to Mackie, the only way moral judgment could be objectively true is if it were
made true by ‘the fabric of the world’ (Mackie, 1977, p. 15). But, Williams claims, we needn’t
accept this worldly condition on moral objectivity and truth. For if, as Kant thinks, morality
can be assimilated to rationality – if moral demands are ‘one[s] that a rational agent must ac-
cept if he is to be a rational agent’ – then ‘[while] moral claims are objectively correct or in-
correct, … when one gives a general explanation of what makes them so, that explanation
does not run through the relation of those statements and the world …’ (ibid., p. 174).14 That
is to say, Kant’s rationalism allows him to explain the objective truth of moral judgment not
in terms of moral judgment’s convergence on a common world, but in terms of moral judg-
ment’s guidance by a common reason. Such judgments are objectively true not because they
accurately reflect the facts, but because they satisfy rational principles. Reason is all; the world
is nothing.15
So understood, I thinkWilliams presents a powerful statement of Kantian metaethical ambi-
tions, at least in their more radical, non‐cognitivist form.16 Moreover, he connects these ambi-
tions explicitly to Kantian rationalism and so seems to be suggesting a rationality argument
for Kantian non‐cognitivism. But what interests me most about William’s discussion is his fur-
ther remark that this unworldly Kantian conception of objectivity and truth applies to logic as
much as to morality. Indeed, Williams avers that insisting on this equal applicability is in fact
‘part of Kant’s point’ (ibid.).
Now, the introduction of logic into this metaethical discussion might seem surprising, but I
don’t think it should be.
First, bracketing for the moment what Kant himself thought, many contemporary Kantians
are drawn to the logical analogy, and it is not hard to see why.17 After all, it seems, if any prin-
ciples can be assimilated to rationality, it is logical ones. Thus, if it can be shown that morality
stands to rationality as logic does, then moral foundations will be as rationally secure as logical
ones – which, one might think, is as rationally secure as anything can be.18 Williams perhaps
goes further than most in connecting the logical analogy to moral semantics, but he has clearly
tapped into a deep current in Kantian thought, one that sees logic and morality alike as, to bor-
row a phrase, woven into the fabric of reason.
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY714
© 2020 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Second, it is clear that Kant himself is a rationalist non‐cognitivist about logic in more or less
the wayWilliams describes.19 That is, asKant sometimes puts it, whatmakes a logical judgment
true is not its objective, material relation, that is, its agreement with its object, the feature of the
world that it is about. Rather, what makes a logical judgment true is its subjective, formal rela-
tion, that is, its agreement with the ‘universal laws of the understanding or reason,’ the principles
of rationality (Kant, 1992, JL 9:50–9:51; Kant, 1996a, KrVA58–A60). Again, reason is all; the
world is nothing.
One might naturally infer from these considerations, as Williams seems to, that Kant has a
unitary view of logical and moral semantics – in which case, Kant’s point in drawing the logical
analogy would be clear. He is a non‐cognitivist about both logic and morality and, apparently,
for the same rationalist reasons. But, in fact, such an inference would be a mistake. Kant does
not have a unitary view of logical and moral semantics. He is non‐cognitivist about logic but
not about morality and this despite being a rationalist about both.
In what follows, then, I will examine Kant’s reasons for thus distinguishing the semantic im-
plications of logical andmoral rationalism. If these reasons are sound, as I believe they are, then
we should be skeptical about the rationality argument for Kantian non‐cognitivism. As Kant
himself understands, even if his followers do not, there is no straight line to be drawn from ratio-
nalism to non‐cognitivism. Even if the moral can be assimilated to the rational, the unworldli-
ness of moral truth does not follow.
III.
I begin with some rudiments of Kant’s rationalist conception of logic.20 Kant’s most basic
characterization of logic is in terms of rules, principles, or laws of rational thought. More specif-
ically, rules of logic are a priori rules of thinking, that is, the propositional activities of judging,
inferring, etc., that Kant attributes to the intellectual faculties of understanding and reason. So
understood, logical rules just are rational rules. They tell us not simply how we do think. They
tell us how we rationally ought to think.
Identifying logic in this way allows Kant to make some distinctions between kinds of logic
that can seem a little unnatural to us. In particular, he distinguishes the logic of ‘the general’
and ‘the particular’ use of the understanding. The former concerns ‘the absolutely necessary
rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place’ (Kant, 1996a, KrV
A52/B76). The latter ‘contains the rules for correctly thinking about a certain kind of object’
(Kant, 1996a, KrV A52/B76). So understood, it is clear that there is but one ‘general logic’ as
Kant calls it, but many ‘particular logics,’ of which metaphysics and mathematics are examples
(Kant, 1992, JL 9:12).21,22
To be clear, this distinction between general logic and particular logics concerns only the do-
main of logical rules: whether they govern all thought, irrespective of its object – general – or
whether they govern only certain kinds of thoughts, individuated by their kinds of objects – par-
ticular. It is in this sense that the former are, as Kant says, absolutely necessary and the latter are
not; whenever you are thinking, you (rationally) must think in accord with the rules of general
logic.
But there is another sense in which the latter are just as necessary as the former; whenever you
are thinking about a certain kind of object, you (rationally)must think in accordwith the rules of
the relevant particular logic. Under this condition, the rules of the particular logic have the same
normative necessity as the rules of general logic. You cannot beg off the rules, except by begging
off the thought governed by those rules, that is, by thinking different kinds of thoughts, thoughts
about different kinds of objects.23
Additionally, as this emphasis on kinds makes clear, Kant thinks that even particular logics
do enjoy a qualified generality. Although they do not govern all thought about all objects, they
do govern all thought about all objects of a certain kind, where the kind in question can be quite
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general. So much is evident, I think, fromKant’s prime example of a particular logic, metaphys-
ics, represented by what he calls in the first Critique ‘transcendental logic.’ This is the particular
logic of theoretical thought, thought about nature. The rules of transcendental logic are rules for
thinking about any natural object. This does not include everything, but it includes quite a lot, a
point to which I will return shortly.
So, for Kant, logic is the genus; general logic and particular logic are species of the genus;
and metaphysics, mathematics, etc. are sub‐species of the species particular logic. Again, this
taxonomy can seem a little unnatural to us, but it appears to track real distinctions among
kinds of rational rules, and so long as we fix our terms, we can avoid confusion.24 In partic-
ular, in what follows, I will favor the Kantian rather than the standard usage of the term
‘logic’ – that is, I will use it to pick out the genus of rational rules rather than the species of
general logic, which is usually what we have in mind when we speak of logic simpliciter: the
single set of rational rules that govern thinking as such. As we shall see, this usage will help
bring into relief the similarities and differences between general logic and logics of other kinds,
including, eventually, morality.
IV.
So far, I have spoken only of logic in terms of rules or norms, the ‘oughts’ of thought. But, of
course, I am primarily interested in logical truth and whether it should be explained cognitively
or not. The relation between these issues, however, is not obvious. After all, ‘oughts’ are imper-
atives and so don’t seem to have truth values; in which case, the problem of accounting for their
truth simply does not arise. Thus, it seems, if we are even to reach the question of cognitivism, we
need some bridge between prescriptive, imperatival principles and descriptive, indicative ones.
There seem to be two ways to go here. One way would be to embed the prescriptions in the
content of the descriptions, so that logical truths are about logical norms, in the sense that they
tell us what those norms are. Consider, for example, the general logical principle of (non‐)con-
tradiction. On this way of thinking, the principle can be expressed in twoways: as a logical norm
that commands us not to think of anything that it has and does not have a given feature, and as a
corresponding logical truth that refers to the norm, stating that one ought not to think of any-
thing that it has and does not have a given feature.25
But there is another way to bridge these two aspects of logic. On this way, one would, as it
were, reverse the above order, embedding the descriptions in the content of the prescriptions,
so that the logical norms are about the logical truths, in the sense that they tell us, in effect, to
think in accord with the truths.26 So, consider contradiction again. There is, as before, a norm
that says not to think of anything that it has and does not have a given feature. But in this case,
the corresponding truth doesn’t refer to the norm. Rather, it refers to what the norm would bid
us think, namely, that nothing has and does not have a given feature.
It is clear, I think, that the dominant way of thinking about the relation of logical norms and
logical truths, in Kant’s time and our own, is the second way and thatKant agrees.27 The logical
truths at issue are not truths about the norms of thought but truths about the objects thought
about – truths, again, like nothing has and does not have a given feature or that everything is
what it is. This is especially evident once one remembers that, for Kant, logic is the genus of
which general and particular logics are species. For in the particular case, just as much as in
the general one, we can query the relation between logical norms and logical truths, for example,
the rules for thinking correctly about metaphysical and mathematical objects and metaphysical
and mathematical truths themselves. And there is no question that in such cases, the relevant
truths are not about the rules but about the objects. Thus, the transcendental logic of the first
Critique, which, as I noted above, is a particular logic of theoretical thought, thought about na-
ture, issues in truths like the Analogies of Experience, for example, in all change substance per-
sists, all alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect, etc.
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These particular logical truths are about nature. They are not truths about how we ought to
think about nature.28
Generally speaking, then, logical rules are rules for thinking; logical truths are truths about
the objects we think about. So much is true, again, of the genus. Applied to the distinction be-
tween general and particular logics, which are species of the genus, we can thus say that general
logical rules are rules for thinking about any object, and so general logical truths are truths about
any object we can think about; particular logical rules are rules for thinking about certain kinds
of objects, and so particular logical truths are truths about objects of those kinds.
So, our question becomes as follows: how to understand the nature of these logical truths? Are
they made true by their objects (cognitivism) or are they not (non‐cognitivism)? Here, I think, it
is clear that Kant thinks that the general case demands a different treatment from the particular
ones. Kant’s key thought, I take it, is something like this. Again, general logical truths are truths
about any object we can think about; that is to say, they are truths that are true of everything.
But, Kant supposes, if the truths are true of everything, then they can’t bemade true by anything.
Thus, as Kant says, general logic abstracts ‘from all content of cognition, i.e., from any relation
of it to the object, and considers only the logical form in relation of cognitions to one another, i.e.,
the form of thinking in general’ (Kant, 1996a, KrV A52/B76, KrV A55/B79; my emphasis).29
What makes such logical truths true, then, is not their agreement with the object, with the world
and everything in it. What makes them true is their agreement with the ‘universal laws of the un-
derstanding and reason,’ which expresses the form or structure of thought itself (Kant, 1992, JL
9:51). Thus, in the general logical case, Kant thinks, logical truth must be understood non‐
cognitively.30
Importantly, no parallel argument holds in the case of particular logics. Particular logical
rules are rules for thinking about certain kinds of objects, so particular logical truths are
truths about objects of those kinds. But here, Kant thinks, there is no pressure to semanti-
cally sever thought and world, for there is no problem at all in thinking that truths that are
true of a certain kind of object are made true by objects of that kind. Indeed, he seems to
regard it as obvious that this is the case. Where the logical rules ‘depend on a determinate
object of cognition,’ as in metaphysics and mathematics, the corresponding logical truths are
thus answerable to those objects (Kant, 1992, JL 9:12). In this respect, particular logical
truths are no different from non‐logical truths, for example, ordinary empirical truths, whose
truth depends on the world if anything does. The a priority of logical truths complicates this
dependence, but it does not call it into question.31
Put another way, Kant treats cognitivism as the default position in logical semantics. Truth is
world‐oriented, so we should presume that logical truths, like other truths, are made true by the
world.32 Of course, Kant believes that this presumption can be rebutted in the case of general
logic. But whether he is right or wrong about this, the main point is simply that it must be rebut-
ted; that general logic is a special case, an exception to the general rule of cognitivism.33 For, as
Kant understands, there is nothing in the nature of logic as such – nothing about rational rules
and their corresponding truths – that implies semantic independence from the world.
V.
What, then, of morality? It seems clear enough that Kantian morality qualifies as a kind of
logic in the generic Kantian sense.34 Moral rules are a priori rules of thought. But not just any
kind of thought, of course. Moral rules are rules of specifically practical thought, the rules of
practical rationality, which tell us how we rationally ought to think when we are thinking
practically.
This is just to say, however, that morality is not a general logic but a particular one. Indeed,
Kant is explicit on this point, including morality among metaphysics and mathematics as key
cases of particular logic (Kant, 1992, JL 9:12). Moreover, he is evidently right to do so, because
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morality obviously lacks the distinguishing feature of general logic, namely, its generality. That
is to say, moral rules are not rules for thinking about any object, and so the correspondingmoral
truths are not truths about any object we can think about. Rather, as in metaphysics and math-
ematics, moral rules are rules for thinking about certain kinds of objects, and somoral truths are
truths about objects of those kinds.
The consequences for cognitivism should be obvious. If morality is a particular logic, then the
Kantian argument for the non‐cognitivism of general logic, even if it were successful, simply
does not apply. Moreover, because, as I noted above, cognitivism seems the default position
in logical semantics, absent some special reason to worry about the cognitive credentials of mo-
rality, it should follow that moral semantics are cognitive too. No less than the rules of meta-
physical and mathematical thinking, the rules of moral thinking ‘depend on a determinate
object of cognition,’ and so the corresponding truths of morality are ultimately answerable to
those objects (Kant, 1992, JL 9:12).35
Now, of course, the plausibility of this conclusion will depend on just what these objects are.
Again, Kantian morality is the particular logic of practical thought. Thus, moral rules are rules
for thinking about practical objects, and moral truths are truths about practical objects. But
which objects are these? Kant answers this question in a number of different ways, talking at
times about freedom, what ought to be, acting, and the good. Although I believe that these
are all ultimately equivalent, I also believe that Kant’s most perspicuous answer combines the
latter two. AsKant puts it in the secondCritique, ‘the only objects of a practical reason are there-
fore the good and the evil,’ where he is clear that ‘good and evil is, strictly speaking, referred to
actions’ (Kant, 1997a, KpV 5:58, 5:60). Thus, practical thought is thought about the practical
good (or evil). And so moral rules, as the particular logic of practical thought, are rules for cor-
rectly thinking about what it is good (or evil) to do, and moral truths are truths about what it is
good (or evil) to do.
At this point, I think, it is helpful to compare the theoretical and practical cases.
As I noted before, the transcendental logic of the first Critique is a particular logic of theoret-
ical thought. Like all logics, this logic can be understood either as a system of norms or as a sys-
temof truths.That is to say, transcendental logic tells us both howweought to think about nature
in general and what that nature we think about is like in general. So understood, the truths of
transcendental logic are formal, not in the sense that general logical truths are formal –
abstracting from all content, from any relation to an object – but in the sense of characterizing
the generic structural features of its object, the constitutive conditions, we might say, of natural
objecthood. So, for example, Kant thinks, without knowing anything about what objects are
in nature–whether, say, they are allmaterial or not –we cananddoknow that those objectsmust
be substances standing in reciprocal causal relations with one another, namely, the three Analo-
gies of Experience. This is (part of) what it is to be a natural object.
The analog of transcendental logic on the practical side, the particular logic of practical
thought, is represented by the moral law, in its various formulations, identified and defended
in the Groundwork and the second Critique.36 Again, this ‘practical logic,’ as we might call it,
can be understood as a system of norms or as a system of truths. That is to say, it tells us both
how we ought to think about what is good in general and what the good we think about is like
in general. So understood, the truths of practical logic are formal, not in the sense that general
logical truths are formal – abstracting from all content, from any relation to an object – but in
the sense of characterizing the generic structural features of its object, the constitutive conditions,
we might say, of practical objecthood. So, for example, Kant thinks, without knowing anything
about specific practical objects, specific good actions, we can and do know that those actions
must have maxims that are universalizable, that reflect the dignity of rational nature, that are
consistent with the autonomy of the will, etc. This is (part of) what it is to be a practical object,
a genuine good.
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY718
© 2020 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Now, in both the theoretical and the practical cases, the truths that we are typically concerned
with aremore specific than these formal, logical ones.Wewant to know not just that the world is
causally ordered, but what causal order it has. We want to know not just that the good can be
jointly pursued by all agents, but which actions actually meet this condition. In order to know
these things, we must go beyond the a priori principles of theory and practice and enter the em-
pirically enriched domains of physics and ethics, the fuller sciences for which theoretical and
practical logics provide the foundations. To this extent, Kant is not, so to speak, a logicist in ei-
ther the theoretical or practical domains. Not all theoretical or practical truths are derivable
from the relevant kind of logic alone.37
But however exactly we think about the relation between these logical and non‐logical truths,
it should be clear that all of these truths are understood in cognitive terms. Whether logical or
non‐logical, whether theoretical or practical, they are all made true by their objects.
VI.
My aim in this paper has been to assess the case for Kantianmetaethical innocence, especially
in its most radical, non‐cognitivist form. I have done this by focusing on what I dubbed the
rationality argument. According to this argument, Kantianism supports non‐cognitivism be-
cause, according to Kantians, the assimilation of the moral to the rational allows for an expla-
nation of moral truth in terms of the satisfaction of rational principle rather than the
reflection of moral facts. In order to better understand and evaluate this argument, I followed
Williams’ suggestion that Kantian moral semantics mirrors Kantian logical semantics – in par-
ticular, that in both cases, there is a straight line to be drawn from rationalist premises to
non‐cognitivist conclusions. By reflecting onKant’s own account of logic andmorality, I argued
that this is not so.While Kant does think that (general) logical rationalism leads to (general) log-
ical non‐cognitivism, he does not think that moral rationalism leads to moral non‐cognitivism.
And with good reason, because the feature of (general) logical rationalism that underwrites this
purported implication does not obtain in the moral case. Thus, even if the moral can be assim-
ilated to the rational, as Kantians think, this provides no support for moral non‐cognitivism.
Kantians cannot avoid substantial metaphysical commitment. Or if they can, it is not their ratio-
nalism that explains why this is so.
This is a negative result, but it has a positive consequence. For by understanding the deficien-
cies of non‐cognitivist Kantianism, we have shed light on a cognitivist alternative, one that al-
lows us to vindicate the logical analogy while keeping moral truth tethered to the world.
According to this view, morality is akin not to general logic but to transcendental logic. So un-
derstood, the moral law does not simply provide principles of practical thought. It also provides
principles of practical‐cum‐moral metaphysics, limning the generic structural features of practi-
cal‐cum‐moral objects, namely, good actions. And so, moral judgments are true not simplywhen
they accord with rational principles but when they accord withmoral facts, facts about what it is
good to do.
Again, to be clear, this is a semantic claim about moral truth. It is not a metaphysical
claim about moral facts. As such, this kind of Kantian cognitivism is entirely consistent with
the more moderate, idealist version of Kantian constructivism I sketched in Section I. That is,
Kantians could hold that there really are moral facts and moral judgments really are true
when they represent those facts accurately (cognitivism). It is just that those facts depend
on us, in the sense that they are constituted by the outcome of our ideal reasoning (idealism).
Thus, even if I am right that Kantians cannot avoid substantial metaphysical commitment,
they may still try to minimize this commitment by making moral facts mind‐dependent.
Now, I don’t think that Kant is or that his followers should be idealists any more than they
should be non‐cognitivists. On the contrary, I think Kant is and his followers should be realists,
though I have not argued the case here.38 My present point is simply that Kantianism does not
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support non‐cognitivism – or, at least, that Kantian rationalism does not support non‐
cognitivism. There is nothing in the thought that themoral can be assimilated to the rational that
should, on its own, lead to the semantic severing of thought and world. So far as I can see, the
better (and more Kantian) Kantianism is a cognitive one.39
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NOTES
1 See especially Rawls 1980 and 2000 and Korsgaard 1996b and 2008.
2 Hence, T. M. Scanlon can write a paper called ‘How I am not a Kantian,’ where what he
very clearly describes is how he is not a constructivist (Scanlon 2011).
3 To be clear, this is moral idealism. It is not transcendental idealism, of the sort that under-
writes the possibility of transcendental freedom. The former is practical and concerns the subject
matter of morality. The latter is theoretical and concerns the subject matter of natural science,
physics broadly construed.Moral idealismwould thus be the practical analog of Kant’s physical
idealism.
4 Although constructivists are sometimes allergic to truth talk, their general tendency is to
accept it. Indeed, it is clear from other passages that Reath uses ‘correctness’ and ‘truth’more or
less interchangeably, for example, ‘[a]ccording to constructivism, [the correct] process of reason-
ing also specifies [the principles’] truth conditions: What makes a principle true or correct is that
it follows from correct reasoning’ (Reath 2010, p. 463). Cf. Korsgaard’s claim that ‘as long as
there is some way of applying the concepts of the right and the good, we will have moral and
more generally normative truth. Statements implying moral concepts will be true when those
concepts are applied correctly’ (Korsgaard, 1996b, p. 35; Korsgaard, 2008, p. 324).
5 For example, reasoning that satisfies the conditions laid out in the so‐called ‘Categorical
Imperative Procedure.’
6 I borrow the term ‘semantic non‐factualism’ fromMark van Roojen, who identifies it as
one of two ‘central common non‐cognitivist claim[s]’ (van Roojen, 2018, sect. 1.1). The other is
what he calls ‘psychological non‐cognitivism.’ I briefly discuss the contrast in the next
paragraph.
7 While there are certainly views that accept both of these theses and indeed relate them, I
am inclined to think they are independent. (See van Roojen, 2018, sect. 2.6 for discussion and
n30). In any case, I will focus exclusively on the semantic thesis in this paper. It is no part of
my account of non‐cognitivist constructivism that it denies that moral judgments express beliefs.
8 Of course, some non‐cognitivists do deny that moral judgments are truth‐apt in any sense
at all. But, again, this is not distinctive of non‐cognitivism, because not all non‐cognitivists so
deny. Indeed, the two leading lights of contemporary non‐cognitivism, Simon Blackburn and
AllanGibbard, are committed to extending truth, belief, and the whole suite of traditionally cog-
nitive concepts to ethical thought and language, non‐cognitively construed. See Blackburn, 1993
and 1998, and Gibbard, 1990 and 2003.
9 One might say that the non‐cognitivist constructivist replaces a metaphysics of the object
with a metaphysics of the subject. It is here that worries about transcendental freedom loom es-
pecially large. Again, I set such worries aside.
10 Reath himself seems to be an idealist. He claims that ‘constructivists can hold that correct
moral principles and moral facts are constituted by practical reasoning, in the sense that correct
principles are those that would result from this idealized process of reasoning’ (Reath, 2010, p.
423, my emphasis). Korsgaard is, I think, harder to pin down, sometimes sounding
non‐cognitivist notes and sometimes sounding idealist ones.
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11 See Korgaard, 1996b, Korsgaard, 2008, Gibbard, 1999, and Gibbard, 2003. For further
discussion of Korsgaard, Gibbard, and doubts about theKantian appropriation of the practical-
ity argument, see Elizondo, 2013.
12 Hereafter, when I speak of Kantian rationalism, I am speaking about this assimilation
claim. One can be a rationalist without accepting this claim. But one cannot, I think, be a
Kantian.
13 I assume here that doing without properties is tantamount to doing without facts, because
facts characterize states of the world, including objects and their properties. In what follows, I
will treat the semantic independence of judgment from facts, the world, objects, and properties
as equivalent ways of expressing the core thesis of non‐cognitivism.
14 Williams is not a Kantian precisely because he rejects this rationalist antecedent. He does,
however, seem at least sympathetic to the conditional.
15 I think a similar thought is at work in Williams’ discussion of the Kantian position in
Chapter 4 of Ethics and Limits of Philosophy (Williams, 1985). (Williams, 1995 was originally
published in 1985). There he claims that theKantian sees practical no less than theoretical reason
as committed to the ‘harmony of everyone’s deliberation’ (ibid., p. 69). In the theoretical case,
this commitment is underwritten by our orientation to the facts, the truths of the world. In the
practical case, it is underwritten (somehow) by the free exercise of reason itself. It is Williams’
doubts about developing this last thought in a credible way that leads him to reject Kantianism.
16 Williams puts the point in terms of Kantian non‐realism, but I think it would be better
expressed in terms of Kantian non‐cognitivism, because, as I have emphasized, there is more
than one way for a Kantian to resist realism: the idealist way of domesticating the moral world
bymaking it mind‐dependent and the non‐cognitivist way of doingwithout theworld altogether.
Williams’ Kant apparently takes the latter tack.
17 Indeed, Korsgaard has gone so far as to identifymoral principles as ‘principles of the logic
of practical deliberation’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p. 67, her emphasis). See also Nagel in his early,
more Kantian incarnation in Nagel, 1970 and Herman, 2006. Additionally, it is worth noting
that many critics of Kantianism appear to target just this analogy when they deny that immoral-
ity is a species of incoherence or contradiction. Consider, for example, Scanlon’s claim that, pace
Kant, ‘the special force of moral requirements seems quite different from that of, say, principles
of logic, even if both are, in some sense, “inescapable.” And the fault involved in failing to be
moved by moral requirements does not seem to be a form of incoherence’ (Scanlon, 1998, p.
151). See also Frankfurt, 2001, p. 259.
18 Notably, thisKantian‐style argument is sometimes deployed in the service of non‐Kantian
conclusions. For example, JaimeDreier endorses the strategy of trying to vindicate practical rules
in the same way one vindicates logical rules, namely, by assimilating them to rules of rationality.
That said, he thinks that, among practical rules, moral rules cannot be so vindicated; only instru-
mental rules can (Dreier, 1997). He is thus a Humean, but for Kantian reasons.J. David
Velleman’s argument in Velleman, 2009 might also put him in a similar camp. There he accepts
theKantian strategy,more or less asWilliam describes it here. But while he agrees withWilliams
that the strategy fails to vindicate morality, he thinks it does nonetheless push us in a pro‐moral
direction. To this extent, it is, as he says, ‘kindaKantian,’marking amiddle ground betweenWil-
liams (andDreier) –who think theKantian strategy can only deliver logic and instrumental rules
–and Kant himself – who thinks it delivers moral ones (Velleman, 2009, p. 149).
19 One might also put the point in terms of the analyticity of logical truth. However, because
Kant uses the term ‘analytic’ in a variety of ways, not all of which privilege semantic indepen-
dence from the world, I think it is more perspicuous to speak about the non‐cognitivism of log-
ical truth. Notably, it is this sense of analyticity, unmoored from Kant’s rationalist
commitments, that is at the fore in later logical empiricist accounts of logic. On this issue, see
n30.
20 My treatment ofKantian logic is quite limited and, inmany respects, simplified. I aim only
to lay out enoughof the view to illuminate the relationbetween logical andmoral rationalismand
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logical and moral semantics. For further discussion of Kantian logic, and its relation to the his-
tory of logic before and after Kant, see Longuenesse, 2005,MacFarlane, 2002, and Burge, 2003.
21 To be clear, themetaphysics at issue in this section is theoretical metaphysics. I will turn to
practical metaphysics in the next section.
22 Kant also distinguishes logics according to whether they are pure or applied. Roughly,
pure logics are a priori and provide the norms for correct thinking. Applied logics are empirical
and consider how those a priori norms are to be implemented in actual human thought, ‘under
the contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote this use…’ (Kant,
1996a, KrV A54/B78). In what follows, I am concerned exclusively with pure logics, general
and particular.
23 In this respect, logical laws operate similarly to civil ones. So long as you live in California,
you live under the jurisdiction ofCalifornia law and notNewYork law.Move toNewYork, and
the opposite is true. But wherever you live in the United States – in California, New York, or
wherever – you live under the jurisdiction of the United States law. Both state and federal laws
bind: the latter under a (more) general condition, the former only under a particular one.
24 Lest one think this is simply an old‐fashioned, outmoded way of thinking about logic, the
basic structure can be found in later philosophers too, including, notably, the father of modern
logic, Frege. As Frege says,
Any law that states what is can be conceived as prescribing that one should think in accordance
with it, and is therefore in that sense a law of thought. This holds for geometrical laws and phys-
ical laws no less than for logical laws. The latter then only deserve the name ‘law of thought’with
more right if it should be meant by this that they are the most general laws, which prescribe uni-
versally how one should think if one is to think at all (Frege, 1997a, p. 202, my emphasis).
As JohnMacFarlane has argued, it is Frege’s identification of logicwith themost general laws of
thought – that is, as what Kant calls ‘general logic’ – that explains how Frege and Kant could
disagree about the truth of logicism, even granting their profoundly different accounts of logic
(MacFarlane, 2002).
25 Although the precise formulation of the principle of (non‐)contradiction is controver-
sial, I hope the present formulation will seem unobjectionable, consistent both with tradi-
tional, quasi‐Parmenidean expressions (‘nothing is and is not’) as well as more modern,
formal ones.
26 I say ‘think in accord with the truths’ rather than simply ‘think the truths’ in order to avoid
the obvious implausibility of thinking that logic tells us to think all the logical truths.
27 As Frege (almost) puts the point, logic can be a normative science without having a nor-
mative subject matter (Frege, 1997b, p. 228).
28 Even if particular logical truths aren’t about norms, one might wonder whether general
logical truths are. It is hard to see, however, why this should be so. Again, there is nothing about
such truths being logical that implies this, because it isn’t true of particular logics. And there also
seems to be nothing about such truths being general that implies this, because generality is simply
a matter of domain. But if it is neither the generality nor the logicality of general logic that ex-
plains why its subject matter is normative while particular logic’s is not, then I do not see what
could explain it. At this level of description, Kant’s account of the subject matter of logic
seems unitary.
29 It is surprisingly difficult to find clear statements of Kant’s reasoning here, but something
like this seems suggested by JL 9:12 (Kant, 1992).
30 Notably, one finds more or less the same line of thought in the 20th century, among
logical empiricists. As Carnap puts it, ‘logical statements are true under all conceivable cir-
cumstances; thus their truth is independent of the contingent facts of the world’ (Carnap,
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1963, p. 25, my emphasis). Or, similarly, logical statements ‘are analytic in the specific sense
that they hold in all possible cases and therefore do not have factual content’ (ibid., p. 47, my
emphasis). Carnap credits Wittgenstein with this non‐cognitivist conception of logical truth,
one ‘based only on [logical statements’] logical structure and the meaning of the terms’ (ibid.,
p. 25). But it is clearly a linguistic variation on a Kantian theme.Thinking about the logical
empiricists is useful here too, because it shows how that the semantic and psychological as-
pects of non‐cognitivism that I mentioned in Section I might come apart. The logical empir-
icists are semantic non‐cognitivists about both logic and morality. But they seem to be
psychological non‐cognitivists, typically emotivists (Ayer, 1952) or prescriptivists (Carnap,
1937, 1963, p. 81), only about morality.
31 It complicates it because while Kant thinks it is relatively easy to explain how ordinary
empirical truths can be made true by the world, it is much harder to explain how metaphysical
andmathematical truths aremade true by the world. This difficultymotivates the main question
of the first Critique – ’how is synthetic a priori cognition possible?’ – as well as its ultimate answer
– transcendental idealism.General logic is exempt from the question (and so its answer) precisely
because its truths are not dependent on the world.
32 Kant is clear that the (nominal) definition of truth is ‘the agreement of cognition with its
object’ (Kant, 1996a, KrV A58/B82; Kant, 1992, JL 9:49–50).
33 In fact, I think he is wrong. The basic reason is this. The key move in Kant’s argument,
again, is his inference from general logical truth’s being true of everything to its not being made
true by anything. But this inference is too quick. For there seems an obvious alternative, namely,
that such truths are true of everything because they are made true by everything. In this way,
general logic would be semantically continuous with particular logic. Just as particular logical
truths are made true by the objects they are about, so would general logical truths be made true
by the objects they are about, namely everything.I noted earlier that the Kantian view is repre-
sented in the 20th century by logical empiricists like Carnap (n30). Recall Carnap’s claim,
quoted earlier, that logical statements ‘are analytic in the specific sense that they hold in all pos-
sible cases and therefore do not have factual content’ (Carnap, 1963, p. 47). But this seems too
quick in exactly the way I just noted. For one could equally say that logical statements’ holding
in all possible cases can be explained by their characterizing necessary and often obvious features
of the world. It is just these features that figure in their factual content. Unsurprisingly, this is
very close to one of the arguments that Quine gives against Carnap inQuine 1976. For insightful
discussion of the broader debate betweenCarnap andQuine on the nature of logical truth, which
gestures to its long pre‐history, see Burge, 2003.
34 To be clear, I am not interested here in Kant’s reasons for thinking that morality is a kind
a logic, that is, his reasons for thinking moral rationalism correct. I am only interested in the re-
lation between moral rationalism and moral semantics.
35 Cf. Kant’s comment in the Groundwork that unlike formal philosophy (logic), material
philosophy (theoretical and practical) ‘has to do with determinate objects and the laws to which
they are subject’ (Kant, 1997b, G 4:387). With respect to their interest in objects, Kant always
treats theoretical and practical philosophy as on a par.
36 Kant explicitly likens the principles of pure practical reason to the principles of transcen-
dental logic at KpV 5:90 (Kant, 1997a). More generally, he clearly conceives of the structure of
theoretical and practical philosophies as parallel. Of special interest here is his claim that just as
the Analytic of the first Critique provides a ‘logic of truth’ (Kant, 1996a,KrVA62/B87), the An-
alytic of the second Critique provides ‘a rule of truth’ (Kant, 1997a, KpV 5:16). See also KrV
A841/B869 (Kant, 1996a), G 4:387–389 (Kant, 1997b), KpV 5:89–90 (Kant, 1997a), KU
5:196–197 (Kant, 2000), and MS 6:214–218 (Kant, 1996b).
37 The relevant contrast, of course, is Frege’s logicism, according to which arithmetic is de-
rivable from (general) logic alone. Cf. Gibbard’s characterization of Korsgaard as a moral
logicist in Gibbard, 1999.
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38 Thus, the analogy I have drawn throughout between Kant’s theoretical and practical phi-
losophies breaks down here. AlthoughKant is both a theoretical and a practical cognitivist, he is
a theoretical idealist and a practical realist.
39 I thank the audiences at UCSB, Amherst, the DC‐Baltimore Kant Workshop, and
Stanford for discussion of early drafts of this paper. I also thank Tyler Burge, Jorah
Dannenberg, Tim Doyle, Barbara Herman, Whitney Schwab, and Yannig Luthra for helpful
discussions of underlying issues.
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